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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the use of macroprudential policies in a low interest rate environment,
where an occasionally-binding zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint gives rise to aggregate demand
externalities. We study this issue by using a DSGE model with financial frictions and a monetary
policy rule that is subject to the ZLB. We find that, in a low interest rate environment, the occasionally
binding ZLB creates additional scope for macroprudential intervention. When the interest rate is
high and the two policies can perfectly coordinate, the optimal policy prescription behave as if they
were independent. This is, however, no more the case, when the interest rate is low and/or when
monetary policy and macroprudential policy cannot be perfectly coordinating. This more complex
policy environment calls for more policy coordination.
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"Also, to the extent that macroprudential policy reduces systemic risks and creates buffers, this helps
monetary policy in the face of adverse financial shocks. It can reduce the risk that monetary policy runs
into constraints such as the zero lower bound– recently hit by many advanced economies." - "Making
Macroprudential Policy Work" Remarks by José Viñals at Brookings, September 16, 2013
1 Introduction
The post-Global Financial Crisis (GFC) world poses new challenges to the conduct of macro-financial
stabilization policies. One of the major changes in this new environment is a significant decline in the
neutral real interest rate. In many advanced economies, estimated long-term neutral rates have declined
to much lower levels compared to the pre-crisis period and show no sign of recovery (Laubach and
Williams, 2015). Plausible explanations for these low interest rates include demographic developments
and the integration of Chinese savings into global financial markets (See Bean et al., 2015). These
low rates are challenging for policymakers for two reasons. First, low neutral rates limit the scope of
conventional monetary policy in stabilizing the economy. Second, low interest rates raise concerns about
financial imbalances and risks to financial stability (Borio, 2016).
Motivated by the dual challenges imposed by the low interest-rate world, in this paper, we study
the optimal conduct of monetary and macroprudential policies in a dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium (DSGE) model. We argue that the case for using macroprudential policies becomes even stronger
in a lower-bound environment.1 In economic theory, two distinct ineffi ciencies create scope for macro-
prudential policy intervention. Firstly, a large body of literature has leveraged pecuniary externalities
to justify macroprudential interventions.2 In models with collateral constraints, for example, negative
shocks to house prices tighten the borrowing capacity of borrowers, making house prices fall further. This
negative feedback mechanism gives rise to a powerful financial accelerator amplifying financial shocks.
Secondly, aggregate demand externalities, as emphasized in Farhi and Werning (2016), provide a dis-
tinct rationale for macroprudential policies. In the context of models with a zero lower bound (ZLB)
for nominal interest rates, borrowers fail to internalize the adverse macroeconomic consequences of their
over-borrowing to aggregate demand. These types of aggregate demand externalities also create the need
1 In policy debates, the use of macroprudential policies to act as a macroeconomic stabilizer is controversial, since these
policies are designed to manage financial cycles at its origin. Instead, the use of unconventional monetary policy and/or
fiscal policy have been widely discussed in the policy circle. Nevertheless, we view that the optimal implementation of
stability policy is still an open question, especially in the rapidly changing economic environment.
2See e.g. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001); Lorenzoni (2008); Bianchi and Mendoza (2010); Jeane and Korinek
(2010, 2013); Woodford (2011); Davilla and Korinek (2017), among others.
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for macroprudential policy intervention.
In this paper, we build a DSGE model with collateral constraints on borrowers and an occasionally
binding ZLB for the interest rate. Our model sets up a stage for both types of externalities to interact
and allows us to study the optimal implementation of simple policy rules for both monetary and macro-
prudential policy. The novel aspect of our paper is that we examine the use of macroprudential policies
in a low interest rate environment, in which an occasionally-binding ZLB gives rise to aggregate demand
externalities. We analyze how this distortion interacts with pecuniary externalities from collateral con-
straints. To study the low interest-rate environment, we set the steady-state interest rate of the model
equal to 2%.3 We then solve the model with the "Occbin" toolkit proposed by Guerrieri and Iacoviello
(2015). Using this framework, we answer the following research questions: first, without an active role
for macroprudential policy, what are the consequences of a steady-state interest rate falling from 4% to
2% for business and financial cycles? Second, can macroprudential policy contribute to greater financial
and macroeconomic stability and enhance social welfare in the low interest-rate environment?
To address the first question, we simulate the model under two steady-state interest rates. Our
simulation results show that, in a 2% steady-state interest-rate environment, the nominal interest rate
hits the ZLB more frequently and stays there for longer periods than in a model with a 4% steady-state
interest rate. This leads to both volatile macroeconomic and financial cycles. Two channels give rise
to more volatile macro dynamics; the collateral channel and the ZLB. Through the collateral channel,
negative demand shocks drive down house prices and tighten the collateral constraint for borrowers. This
negatively affects credit. This feedback loop between house prices and credit gives rise to a powerful
financial accelerator, emphasized in Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010). Furthermore, when
the occasionally binding ZLB restricts the interest rate, it provides additional amplification of the shock.
In this case, the anticipation that the interest rate will be forced to stay at zero for some time reinforces
the effects of the negative demand shock. Inflation falls and pushes up the real cost of borrowing.
This, in turn, depresses house prices and credit even further than under the collateral channel (See Neri
and Notarpietro, 2014). The interaction of these two frictions in this model provides a rationale for
macroprudential policy intervention.
Next, we study the case of active macroprudential policy rules as a supplement to monetary policy.
3 In this paper, we choose to motivate the change in real interest rate at the steady state as a result of unmodeled slow-
moving long-run forces, such as population aging (Eggertsson, Lancastre and Summers, 2018). We view those long-run
forces as the primary drivers that change the economic environment in which macro policies are operating. Hamilton et al.
(2015) interpret the equilibrium level of the real federal funds rate as the long-run or steady-state value of the real funds
rate and find that it has fallen to about 2% in advanced economies.
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In particular, we compute optimal simple rules for the LTV by minimizing a welfare-based loss function
for the macroprudential regulator. We consider an LTV rule that responds to credit and output. We
find that, in the high interest-rate world, allowing macroprudential policy to respond to output does
not significantly improve welfare. When the steady-state interest rate is closer to the ZLB, however,
the occasionally binding ZLB gives rise to aggregate demand externalities that create additional scope
for macroprudential intervention. Our results show that, in the low interest-rate environment, a purely
financial-stability focused macroprudential authority needs to use its instrument more aggressively to
stabilize financial cycles than in normal times. Furthermore, we find that allowing macroprudential
policy to respond directly to output strengthens economic stability. In this case, the macroprudential
policy helps monetary policy by managing the cost of borrowing when monetary policy is binding at the
ZLB.
Lastly, we also use the model to study policy coordination, where both policies are optimized jointly.
We find that, when the interest rate is high and the two policies can perfectly coordinate, the optimal
policy prescription behaves as if policies were independent. Price stability is delegated to monetary
policy, while financial stability can be effectively managed by the macroprudential authority. The two
policies work more or less independently using different instruments to target different objectives. This
is, however, no longer the case when the interest rate is low and/or when the two policies cease to
coordinate. In this more complex policy environment, policy coordination brings more welfare gains.
Our paper is related to the strand of research that, following Iacoviello (2005), introduces a rule
on the LTV interacting with monetary policy. For instance, Borio and Shim (2007) emphasize the
complementary role of macroprudential policy to monetary policy and its supportive role as a built-in
stabilizer. Similarly, N’Diaye (2009) shows that monetary policy can be supported by countercyclical
prudential regulation, and Angelini et al. (2014) show interactions between LTV and capital requirements
ratios and monetary policy. However, the literature above does not explicitly consider the impact of
an occasionally binding ZLB. On the other hand, Neri and Notarpietro (2014) consider a model in
which monetary policy is constrained by the ZLB. They find that, in this special circumstance, shocks
that should reduce inflation and stimulate output can have contractionary effects on economic activity.
However, this paper does not take into account macroprudential policies.
Antipa and Matheron (2014) study the interactions of macroprudential and unconventional monetary
policies when the interest rate hits the zero lower bound. They find that macroprudential policies act as
a useful complement to forward guidance policy during ZLB periods. Wu and Zhang (2016) integrate
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shadow rates into the Iacoviello model. They find that when the ZLB is reached, alternative policy
measures can be used, so that shadow rates are not limited by the ZLB. Our paper abstracts from
unconventional monetary policy, but we find a similar result regarding complementarity between LTV
rules and monetary policy. Lewis and Villa (2016) study the interactions between monetary policy and
a countercyclical capital buffer when monetary policy is constrained at the ZLB. Korinek and Simsek
(2016) find that when the interest rate is limited by the ZLB, welfare can be improved by ex-ante macro-
prudential policies such as debt limits and mandatory insurance requirements. Our paper complements
this literature and contributes to it by studying the interaction between LTV policy and monetary policy
in a low interest-rate environment, in which the ZLB for the interest rate occasionally binds. We show
how macroprudential policy can simultaneously contribute to financial and macroeconomic stability.
Most closely related to our paper is the seminal work by Farhi and Werning (2016), who study the
interaction between the ZLB and using macroprudential policy as a stabilization tool. They consider a
simple two-period model to show that, when the ZLB is binding, the interest rate fails to stimulate the
economy to the optimal allocation. In this situation, macroprudential policy, in the form of a tax on
borrowing, can induce the implicit interest rate to adjust to the level that provides economic stability.
Our paper complements their study in the sense that we investigate the interaction between monetary
policy that is subject to the ZLB and a more plausible macroprudential policy setting with the LTV ratio,
in a DSGE model. Our model is arguably more realistic than theirs and includes many features that
are relevant for policy. Our quantitative results confirm their finding that, under certain circumstances,
the optimal policy mix is featured as independent targeting rules. We extend their analysis to the
non-coordination case and in the low interest-rate environment. We show that, in the low interest-rate
environment, the two policies appeared to be more intertwined, so that the policy coordination is socially
beneficial.
The rest of the paper continues as follows. Section 2 describes the model environment and calibration.
Section 3 simulates and studies the dynamics of the model allowing for a ZLB constraint in the low
interest-rate environment. In Section 4, we conduct an optimal policy analysis. Section 5 shows the
robustness of our main results. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Model Setup
The economy features patient and impatient households, a final goods firm, a central bank which con-
ducts monetary policy, and a macroprudential authority that sets financial regulation. Households work
and consume both consumption goods and housing. Patient and impatient households are savers and
borrowers, respectively. Borrowers are credit constrained and need collateral to obtain loans. The rep-
resentative firm converts household labor into the final good. The central bank follows a Taylor rule
for the setting of interest rates, and the macroprudential regulator uses the LTV as an instrument for
macroprudential policy.
2.1 Savers














where βs ∈ (0, 1) is the patient discount factor, E0 is the expectation operator and Cs,t, Hs,t and Ns,t
represent consumption at time t, the housing stock and working hours, respectively. 1/η is the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply, η > 0. j represents the weight of housing in the utility function.
Savers maximize their utility subject to the following budget constraint:




+ ws,tNs,t + qtHs,t−1 + Ft, (1)
where bt denotes bank deposits, Rt is the gross return from deposits, qt is the price of housing in
units of consumption, πt is the inflation rate, and ws,t is the real wage rate. 4 Ft denotes lump-sum
profits received from the firms. The constant τh is a tax/subsidy on savers’housing that we assume is
eliminating the distortion at the steady state in the housing market.5 The first order conditions for this
optimization problem are as follows:
4This wage rate is specific to the savers because we will use a Cobb-Douglas production function which implies that labor
efforts of constrained and unconstrained consumers are not perfect substitutes. This specification is analytically tractable
and allows for closed form solutions for the steady state of the model. This assumption can be economically justified by
the fact that savers are the managers of the firms and their wage is higher than the wage received by borrowers.
5We follow Ferrero et al. (2018) to add this tax to the saver’s housing demand, in order to close the housing gap between
savers and borrowers at the steady state. This modelling choice is only for deriving the welfare based loss function, and it





















Equation (2) is the Euler equation, the intertemporal condition for consumption. Equation (3) is the
labor-supply condition and Equation (4) represents the intertemporal condition for housing, in which,
at the margin, the benefits from consuming housing equate costs in terms of consumption.
2.2 Borrowers



















+ qt (Hb,t −Hb,t−1) = bt + wb,tNb,t, (5)
Rtbt ≤ ktEt [qt+1πt+1Hb,t] , (6)
where bt denotes bank loans for borrowers. These are the converse of savers’ deposits. kt can be
interpreted as a loan-to-value ratio.6 The borrowing constraint limits borrowing to the present discounted
6 In standard housing models, the LTV is a parameter. However, in our model, this has a subindex t because it is the
macroprudential instrument.
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− λtktEt (qt+1πt+1) . (9)
where λt denotes the multiplier on the borrowing constraint.8 These first order conditions can be
interpreted analogously to the ones of savers.
2.3 Firms
2.3.1 Final Goods Producers
There is a continuum of identical final goods producers that operate under perfect competition and










where ε > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. The final good firm chooses







The price index is then given by:
7As discussed in Iacoviello (2005), when the model is parameterized with an amount of uncertainty that is suffi cient to
replicate the volatility which is observed in macroeconomic time series, such uncertainty does not generate a substantial
amount of buffer-stock behavior in the model. This happens provided that the borrowing constraint is tight enough, that
relative risk aversion is not too large, and that the gap between the interest rate and the discount rate is not too small.
The presence of uncertainty implies that in a model of the kind presented below there is precautionary saving. However, we
assume that the precautionary forces are weak enough so that borrowers always choose the maximum amount of borrowing
possible and so that the model can be analysed as if the constraint was an equality constraint. In other words, we have
chosen parameter values so that there is no precautionary saving; the precautionary incentive is outweighed by impatience
in our calibration.
8Through simple algebra, it can be shown that the Lagrange multiplier is positive in the steady state and thus the










2.3.2 Intermediate Goods Producers
The intermediate goods market is monopolistically competitive. Following Iacoviello (2005), intermediate
goods are produced according to the production function:
Yt (z) = AtNs,t (z)
αNb,t (z)
(1−α) , (13)
where α ∈ [0, 1] measures the relative size of savers and borrowers in terms of labor.9
At represents technology and it follows the following autoregressive process:
log (At) = ρA log (At−1) + uAt, (14)
where ρA is the autoregressive coeffi cient and uAt is a normally distributed shock to technology. We
normalize the steady-state value of technology to 1.














where Xt is the markup, or the inverse of marginal cost.10
The price-setting problem for the intermediate good producers is a standard Calvo-Yun setting. The
intermediate good producer sells its good at price Pt (z) , and has a 1 − θ ∈ [0, 1] probability of being















where ε/ (ε− 1) is the steady-state markup and τ is a tax/subsidy equal to ε−1, which corrects the
distortion associated with monopolistic competition at the steady state.
9Notice that the absolute size of each group is one.
10Symmetry across firms allows us to write the demands without the index z.
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The aggregate price level is given by:
Pt =
[




Using log-linearized versions of (17) and (18), we can obtain a standard forward-looking New Keyne-
sian Phillips curve π̂t = βEtπ̂t+1−ψx̂t+uπt, that relates inflation positively to future expected inflation
and negatively to the markup ( ψ ≡ (1− θ) (1− βθ) /θ). uπt is a normally distributed cost-push shock.
In the canonical new Keynesian model, cost-push shocks (also called inflation shocks) and typically in-
troduced. The introduction of these exogenous shocks creates a trade-off between inflation and output
stabilization. Variables with a hat denote percent deviations from the steady state.
2.4 Equilibrium
The market clearing condition for consumption goods is as follows:
Yt = ωCs,t + (1− ω)Cb,t, (19)
where ω is the population share of savers.
The total supply of housing is fixed and normalized to unity:
H̄ = ωHs,t + (1− ω)Hb,t, (20)
where H̄ is housing supply, which is assumed to be fixed.
2.5 Monetary Policy



















We consider a standard Taylor rule which responds to inflation and output, with interest-rate smooth-
ing, where φRπ ≥ 0, φRy ≥ 0 measure the response of interest rates to current inflation and output devia-
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tions from the steady state, respectively. R is the steady-state interest rate. However, we impose a ZLB
constraint on the interest rate so that it cannot reach negative values when it follows the Taylor rule.
Thus, RTRt is the policy rate implied by the Taylor rule while Rt is the actual rate, both expressed in
gross terms.
2.6 A Macroprudential Rule for the LTV
In standard models, the LTV ratio is a fixed parameter, which is not affected by economic conditions.
However, we can think of regulations of LTVs as a way to moderate credit booms. When the LTV is high,
the collateral constraint is less tight. Moreover, since the constraint is binding, borrowers will borrow
as much as they are allowed. Lowering the LTV tightens the constraint and therefore restricts the loans
that borrowers can obtain. The literature on macroprudential policies has proposed rules for the LTV
so that it reacts inversely to variables such as the growth rate of GDP, credit, the credit-to-GDP ratio
or house prices. These rules provide a simple illustration of how a macroprudential policy could work
in practice. We assume that the objective of the macroprudential regulator is to avoid situations that
lead to excessive credit growth; when there is a boom in the economy or house prices increase, agents
borrow more. Therefore, we take deviations of credit and output from their respective steady states as










where kSS is a steady state value for the LTV, and φb ≥ 0, φy ≥ 0 measure the response of the LTV to
borrowing and output, respectively. This kind of rule delivers a lower LTV in booms, when credit and
output are high, therefore restricting the credit in the economy and avoiding a credit boom derived from
good economic conditions.12
We choose this specific functional form in the spirit of Basel III reports on countercyclical buffers,
adapted for the specific context of a low interest-rate environment. The Basel III guide on countercyclical
buffers states that credit variables are a useful reference point in taking buffer decisions. Given the guide’s
close links to the objectives of the buffer and its demonstrated usefulness in many jurisdictions as an
indicator of the build-up of system-wide risk in a financial system in the past, it is reasonable that it
11We consider that financial regulators cyclically vary the financial constraint but not permanently set the constraint to
a permanently looser level. The rationale behind could be that moral hazard problems à-la Kiyotaki-Moore build up over
time and do not materialize instantaneously when the constraint is relaxed for a short amount of time.
12Funke and Paetz (2012) consider a non-linear version of this macroprudential rule for the LTV.
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should be part of the information considered by the authorities. As such, according to Basel III, the
buffer is not meant to be used as an instrument to manage economic cycles or asset prices. However,
particularly in the low interest-rate context that we are considering in this paper, monetary policy is not
effective when it hits the ZLB. Therefore, we believe that it is worthwhile to include output in the LTV
rule to account for possible complementarity between macroprudential and monetary policy (See Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010). Note that this type of financial constraint does not arise
endogenously within the model but comes exogenously from regulation. This is the difference between
market and government-imposed constraints. We choose the latter approach. However, the rationale for
macroprudential policy interventions can be justified in terms of the model.
On the one hand, the binding collateral constraint introduces a pecuniary externality in the sense
that borrowers always choose the maximum amount allowed. This creates a distortion that can be
corrected by a mechanism such as a macroprudential policy that softens credit cycles. On the other
hand, the ZLB constraint creates a demand externality since at those instances, monetary policy cannot
stabilize the macroeconomy. This implies an extra motive for macroprudential policy to help monetary
policy soften the macroeconomic cycle. This extra externality explains the presence of output in the
macroprudential rule.
2.7 Baseline Parameter Values
For simulations, we create two types of environments; one which we call "normal times," in which the
steady-state annual interest is 4% as in the standard RBC models, and a second one called "low interest
rate" in which the steady-state interest rate is 2%. For the "normal times" case, the discount factor
for savers, βs, is set to 0.99 to match a 4% interest rate in the steady state. The discount factor for
borrowers in this scenario is set to 0.98.13 For the "low interest rate" environment, we set βs to 0.995.
In order to keep the same difference across agents’discount factors in both scenarios, we set βb to 0.985
in this case. The steady-state weight of housing in the utility function, j, is set to 0.1 in order for the
ratio of housing wealth to GDP to be approximately 1.40 in the steady state, consistent with the US
data, as in Iacoviello (2005). We set η = 1, implying a value of the labor supply elasticity of 1.14 For the
13Lawrance (1991) estimated discount factors for poor consumers at between 0.95 and 0.98 at quarterly frequency. We
take the most conservative value.
14Microeconomic estimates usually suggest values in the range of 0 and 0.5 (for males). Domeij and Flodén (2006) show
that in the presence of borrowing constraints these estimates could have a downward bias of 50%.
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parameter controlling leverage, we set kSS to 0.90, in line with the US data (See Iacoviello, 2005).15 The
labor-income share for savers is set to 0.64, following the estimate in Iacoviello (2005). For the Taylor
rule, we consider the standard values φRπ = 1.5 and φ
R
y = 0.5, consistent with the original estimates by
Taylor.16 For ρ we use 0.8, which represents an empirically plausible value.
We simulate the response of the model to a demand and technology shock. For the calibration of
the shocks, we use the estimates of Smets and Wouters (2007), for the US economy, as an empirically
plausible size and persistence of the shocks. We assume that technology, At, follows an autoregressive
process with 0.95 persistence and a normally distributed shock of 0.45% size.17 The persistence of the
demand shock is 0.22, with a 0.23% size. Table 1 presents a summary of the parameter values used:
Table 1: Parameter Values
βs 0.99/0.995 Discount Factor for Savers
βb 0.98/0.985 Discount Factor for Borrowers
j 0.1 Weight of Housing in Utility Function
1/η 1 Frisch elasticity of labor supply
kSS 0.9 Loan-to-value ratio
α 0.64 Labor share for Savers
X 1.2 Steady-state markup
θ 0.75 Probability of not changing prices
ρ 0.8 Smoothing parameter in Taylor rule
φRπ 1.5 Inflation parameter in Taylor rule
φRy 0.5 Output parameter in Taylor rule
2.8 Quantitative Properties of the Model
In this subsection, we compare the quantitative properties of the model with the US data under the
chosen calibration.
15Experimenting with lower values of the LTV ratio weakens the financial accelerator effects and the need for macropru-
dential policies. A value of the LTV ratio of 90%, which is consistent with values in many countries, gives more powerful
results.
16We are aware that in a quarterly model, this value should be divided by 4. However, to be consistent with the rest of
the literature, we use 0.5 as a baseline. We have experimented with other values of this parameter and results are virtually
unchanged.
17The high persistence of the shocks is also consistent with the estimates in Iacoviello and Neri (2010).
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Table 2: Quantitative Properties
Y C q b π R
US Data (1950 Q1 - 2007 Q4)
Variance (%) 2.49 1.65 5.62 6.56 0.98 2.10
Relative variance to output 1 0.66 2.26 2.63 0.39 0.84
Auto-correlation (1) 0.82 0.79 0.85 0.93 0.81 0.82
Cross-Correlation to output 1 0.78 0.35 0.60 0.15 0.34
Benchmark model
Variance (%) 2.31 2.31 1.63 8.75 0.40 0.31
Relative variance to output − 1 0.70 3.82 0.18 0.14
Auto-correlation (1) 0.77 0.77 0.87 0.45 0.97 0.16
Cross-Correlation to output − 1 0.89 0.69 0.14 0.13
In Table 2, we compare the actual US data with the simulated data from our benchmark calibration,
discussed in the previous section.18 To simulate the model, we draw different sequences of shocks from
the distribution displayed above and solve the model 2000 times. The mean of the simulated moments
is reported in this table, while, in figure 1, we also plot the histogram of the simulated model moments
(blue bars), compared to the sample moments from the real data (vertical red line).
Data moments represent the typical patterns of business cycles, well documented in the literature.
In particular, consumption is less volatile than output, while house prices and credit are much more
volatile. All time series are highly persistent. The model, with only demand and technology shocks,
replicates the moments of the actual data in several important aspects. First, our model captures the
volatility and persistence of output very well. In addition, the model with collateral constraints also
matches the volatility of credit and the persistence of house prices. Nonetheless, our model is a very
parsimonious representation of the real economy, and therefore it misses some features from the US
data. For example, consumption in the model is equal to output, because there is no capital or housing
investment. In addition, credit in the model is one-period debt, while, in the real world, especially in the
US, mortgage debt is long-term loans. As a result, the model simulation cannot match the persistence
18The US time series data are taken quarterly from 1950 Q1 to 2007 Q4. We choose the periods, during which the ZLB
was not binding. Both inflation and the nominal interest rate are expressed in annualized percentage terms. For the other
real variables, we first take the logarithm and then we extract the cyclical business component by using the Hodrick-Prescott
(HP) filter, with a smoothing parameter of 1600. Therefore, the units are expressed as percentage deviations from the HP
trends of the respective time series.
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Figure 1: Comparing model simulated moments (2000 runs) with data moments
of household credit in the data. Overall, despite its simplicity, the model does catch some important
features of the data before the ZLB periods. Next, we use the model to simulate the counterfactual
economy under the low steady-state interest rates.
3 The Low Interest-Rate Environment
The GFC has caused us to re-think and re-shape existing models to appropriately reflect changes oc-
curring in the economy. Standard solution methods for DSGE models did not take into account the
possibility of having the interest rate constrained at the ZLB, which has been proven to be a crucial
feature of the economy. Large enough shocks may bring the policy rate to negative levels, violating the
ZLB. Therefore, it is important to be able to introduce this constraint in monetary policy models.
Occasionally binding lower bounds pose a technical challenge to solving DSGE models. In this paper,
we use the solution method proposed by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015), namely the "occbin" toolbox,19
which implements a piecewise-linear approximation to solve DSGE models with occasionally binding
constraints. The key advantage of the toolbox isis that it can solve the rational expectations solution
when the duration of each regime is unknown. For instance, in this method, the duration of the binding
regime does not need to be fixed at a predetermined value, instead it depends on the realization of shocks.
19There are alternative solution methods in the literature. For example, Jones (2015) shows that if the Blanchard-Kahn
conditions are satisfied for the linearized model under the non-zero lower bound regime, then the "occbin" method developed
by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015) yields the same path for the endogenous variables as his approach. This is the case of
our model.
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Figure 2: Impulse responses to a negative demand shock
The expected length of a regime affects the value of the endogenous variables contemporaneously. The
"occbin" toolbox uses a guess-and-verify procedure to generate time-varying policy functions depending
on the expected duration of regimes at each period. In our case, the constraint that binds occasionally is
the ZLB. Under one regime, the ZLB constraint is slack. Under the other regime, the constraint binds.
Using this toolkit, we linearize the model under each regime around the non-binding steady state.
To illustrate how the occasionally binding ZLB affects the dynamics in the model, we compute impulse
responses to a negative demand shock20, using both the standard solution method and the "occbin"
toolkit. With this example, we show that explicitly modelling the occasionally binding ZLB delivers an
enhanced propagation mechanism via the collateral channel for both real and financial variables.
Figure 2 shows the dynamics of the model following this negative demand shock. In this figure, we
consider the case in which the economy is not constrained by the ZLB (dashed blue line) as opposed to
the occasionally binding ZLB case (solid red line). The upper- left panel displays the annualized level
of the policy rate. It starts at the steady-state level of 4%. We see that, when there are occasionally
binding constraints for the interest rate, the policy rate reaches the zero lower bound and stays there
for some periods before converging to the Taylor rule interest rate. The non-constrained interest rate,
20Similar plot for productivity shocks is available upon request from authors.
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however, becomes negative. This discrepancy between the two rates makes the rest of the variables
also behave differently. In particular, both output and inflation respond in a much stronger manner in
the world in which the interest rate is constrained. Two channels drive the deeper output recession in
the occasionally binding model. Firstly, the negative impact of the demand shock is amplified by the
collateral channel of borrowers, even without a ZLB. As shown in dashed blue lines, when the negative
shock hits, house prices fall and tighten the collateral constraint for borrowers. This, in turn, negatively
affects credit via the collateral constraint. This feedback loop between house prices and credit gives rise
to a powerful financial accelerator, emphasized in Iacoviello (2005). Even though, in this case, the central
bank can support the economy by cutting the interest rate dramatically, the economy suffers an output
recession. Secondly, as pointed out in Farhi and Werning (2016), when the occasionally binding ZLB
restricts the interest rate, the economy suffers an even stronger recession because of aggregate demand
externalities. The combination of deflation and the binding ZLB of the nominal interest rate pushes up
the real cost of borrowing. The rise in the real interest rate depresses house prices and credit further,
triggering the collateral effect on the real economy. As shown by the solid red lines, in the occasionally
binding economy, the interest rate falls to zero and stays there for a few periods. In the meantime,
inflation decreases more strongly, pushing up the real interest rate. As a result, house prices, credit and
output decrease by more than in the case where the ZLB is ignored.
The interaction between collateral constraints and an occasionally binding ZLB provides a rationale
for macroprudential policy intervention, and the need is even greater when the steady-state interest rate
is low. In this next subsection, we formally make this point by simulating the model under different
steady-state interest rates (high and low).
3.1 Simulations
Table 3: Low Interest rate Economies
Models ZLB Output Credit
Prob.(%) Duration (Qtr) V olatility (%) Autocorr. V olatility (%) Autocorr.
iSS = 4% 0 0 2.31 0.77 8.75 0.45
iSS = 2% 0.02 1.03 2.34 0.76 16.38 0.40
iSS = 1.2% 1.58 1.11 2.35 0.74 24.36 0.37
iSS = 0.4% 26.1 1.87 4.18 0.71 183.68 0.32
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In Table 3, we report the statistics of the simulated economy under different levels of steady-state
interest rates, compared to the benchmark case. We simulate 1000 periods each time to derive the
statistics and repeat this exercise for 2000 simulations. In the table, we report the average values over
all simulations. When the steady-state interest rate is equal to 4%, small business cycle shocks will
not trigger any binding ZLB incidences. However, when the interest rate decreases towards zero, the
probability of a binding ZLB and the average duration of each binding case increases. As a result, both
business cycles and financial cycles become more volatile but slightly less persistent.
4 Can Macroprudential Policy Help?
As the previous simulations show, economies with financial frictions and low interest rates are par-
ticularly vulnerable when the conventional monetary policy is subject to the ZLB constraint. This
circumstance calls for the need of other policies to stabilize the economy. In this paper, we explore the
role of macroprudential policy as a supplementary stability policy.21 Macroprudential policy is a natural
candidate for alternative stabilization policy in low-interest rate environment. Firstly, it is a targeted
tool for addressing issues of financial instability. Secondly, macroprudential policy affects the cost of
borrowing, so it can be used as a complement (or substitute) to monetary policy when it is restricted
by the ZLB to stabilize the real economy. For the rest of the paper, we use the "low interest-rate"
environment as the benchmark calibration and study how active LTV rules can help monetary policy to
stabilize the economy.
For the following analysis, we simplify the macroprudential policy setting to a set of simple LTV
rules. The most basic LTV rule for macroprudential policy can be specified as the LTV responding







where φb is the policy parameter set by the macroprudential authority. Similarly, LTV rules can be
extended to respond to other variables, such as the credit-to-GDP ratio, credit growth or output. We
perform several robustness checks on this respect.
21 In the policy debate, other policy measures, such as unconventional monetary policy and fiscal policy, are also frequently
mentioned. In this study, for the sake of scope and focus of the paper, we abstract the model from those alternative policies,
even though they could also be interesting subjects in the low interest-rate environment.
22 In the robustness section, we check the sensitivity of our main results using other financial indicators for the LTV rule.
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From Equation (25), we see that when the LTV rule parameter (φb) is set to be high, credit is less
affected by shocks to asset prices or interest rates.
4.1 Welfare-based Policy Loss Function
In this section, we assess the optimal combination of the parameters in the LTV rules, which minimizes
a social welfare function. Optimal policy analysis, in models with financial frictions, deserves some
discussion. In the standard new Keynesian model, the central bank aims at minimizing the variability
of inflation to reduce the distortion introduced by nominal rigidities and monopolistic competition.23
However, in models with collateral constraints, welfare analysis and the design of optimal policies involves
several issues not considered in standard sticky-price models. In models with constrained individuals,
there are two types of distortions: price rigidities and credit availability subject to collateral constraints.
The latter creates conflicts and trade-offs between borrowers and savers. Savers may prefer policies that
reduce the price stickiness distortion, while borrowers who operate in a second-best situation may prefer
a scenario in which the pervasive effect of the collateral constraint is softened. A more stable financial
system would provide borrowers with a smoother consumption pattern as their consumption is directly
linked to credit through the collateral constraint. As a result, to evaluate different policy rules, we need
to derive a social welfare-based policy loss function that takes into account this heterogeneity between
savers and borrowers.
To obtain the welfare-based policy loss function, we derive the second-order approximation of the


















where ỹt = yt− ynt , c̃t = cb,t− cs,t and h̃t = hb,t−hs,t, are the output gap, consumption gap and housing
gap between borrowers and savers, respectively. πt is the inflation deviation from the steady-state






23 It only needs to minimize inflation volatility due to the divine coincidence.
24Detailed derivations are shown in the Appendix.
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The welfare-based loss function (26) has a clear economic interpretation in each of its components in
terms of wedges to the effi cient steady state. The first two include the effi cient output gap and inflation.
These are the standard variables that appear in the welfare-based loss function of a large class of new
Keynesian models. Their presence in the welfare function reflects the two distortions associated with
price rigidities. First, monopolistic competition introduces a "labor wedge" into the model, causing
the level of output to deviate from its effi cient level. Second, the staggered price setting implies an
ineffi cient dispersion in prices, which is proportional to the rate of inflation. The second set of terms
in (26) comprises the consumption and the housing gap. They arise from the heterogeneity between
the two types of agents in terms of their access to finance, where one group of households are credit-
constrained while the other is not. Savers could insure each other against the variation in their housing
and consumption bundles, while the quantity of housing collateral limits borrowers in the model. The
gaps in consumption and housing between optimizing savers and constrained borrowers give policymakers
a measure of the welfare loss associated with the financial friction.
We make a further assumption that the policymaker takes unconditional expectations on the periodic
welfare-based loss function, instead of conditional expectations period by period when evaluating it.25


























































In the last step of algebra, we take the gap variables out of the summation operator, as the unconditional
variance of the gap variables is independent of time. We use this welfare-based loss function to evaluate
different combinations of the policy parameters. The solution to this problem is represented by the
following expression:
25Taking unconditional expectations on the loss function can be theoretically justified as an "unconditional continuation
policy" by Jensen and McCallum (2002, 2010).
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φ∗ = arg minW (φ) ,
subject to the model equations.
4.2 Optimal Simple Rules for LTV Policy
In this section, we study how the macroprudential rule could be used as a supplement to monetary policy
for macroeconomic stabilization. In particular, we first consider a rule in which the macroprudential
regulator only responds to credit deviations from the steady state. Then, we extend the rule to allow
the macroprudential instrument to also respond to output.
In Table 4, we report the optimized values of the LTV rule coeffi cients and the volatilities of the
key variables that drive the welfare-based loss function (27). The percentage numbers are the value of
welfare-loss and its four components, i.e. variances of the output gap, inflation, the consumption gap,
and the housing gap, respectively. For comparison, we first report results that are generated from the
economy without LTV rules, which we take as a benchmark. Next, we compare them with the values
that are produced by two rules responding to different variables. In the upper panels of the table, we
describe the economy in the high interest-rate environment (4% steady-state interest rate), while in the
lower panels, results are generated in the low interest-rate scenario (2% steady-state interest rate).
Table 4: Optimal Macroprudential Rules







High interest-rate environment φ∗b φ
∗
y %
Benchmark (No LTV) - - -11.45 1.6 0.16 9.6 121
LTV Rule with Credit 0.43 - -9.96 2.1 0.25 17.3 50.6
LTV Rule with Credit and Output 0.43 0.24 -9.83 2.0 0.25 16.4 51.7
Low interest-rate environment
Benchmark (No LTV) - - -27.97 3.5 0.45 24.8 279
LTV Rule with Credit 0.46 - -15.56 3.3 0.43 34.5 58.9
LTV Rule with Credit and Output 0.76 0.35 -14.97 3.2 0.44 35.1 45.4
Note: In this table, all policy scenarios are based on monetary policy using a Taylor rule with φRπ= 1.5 and φ
R
y = 0.5.
All volatilities and values of the loss function are reported in the unit of percentage points.
21
First of all, driven by the same shocks, the economy in the high interest-rate environment is signifi-
cantly less volatile than that in the low interest-rate environment. This leads to a significant increase in
the welfare loss in the low interest-rate economy. As we discussed before, in the low interest-rate world,
the ZLB is binding more frequently. As it lacks an effective stabilization policy, the economy becomes
more volatile in both the real and financial sectors. This has severe welfare consequences for the agents
in the economy, especially for credit-constrained borrowers. By decomposing the drivers of the welfare
loss we reveal that the housing gap between savers and borrowers is the main contributor to the welfare
loss in the economy. This finding motivates the need for using a macroprudential policy to enhance
welfare, especially in the low interest-rate environment.
When introducing an active LTV rule responding to credit, we see that the welfare loss is improved
in both economies substantially. Interestingly, in the high interest-rate world, the credit-focused macro-
prudential rule faces a trade-off between financial and macroeconomic stability. Optimal response to
credit significantly reduces the welfare loss caused by the consumption gap and the housing gap, but
the volatility of the output gap and the inflation gap are slightly increased. On the other hand, in
the low interest-rate world, the credit-only-LTV rule dampens both the volatility of the inequality gap
and macroeconomic fluctuations. Compared to the high interest rate economy, the LTV rule needs to
respond more strongly to credit than in the low interest-rate environment.
In the next experiment, we extend the LTV rule to a version that responds to both credit and
output. Results show that, in the high interest-rate world, allowing macroprudential policy to respond
to output does not significantly improve the welfare loss. The monetary authority effectively manages
macroeconomic stability through the Taylor rule. When the steady-state interest rate is closer to the
ZLB, however, the optimized rule responds strongly both to credit and output. As discussed above,
the binding ZLB becomes the major distortion in the economy that affects welfare, both by amplifying
macroeconomic fluctuations and the inequality of the economy through financial frictions. In this case,
the macroprudential policy helps monetary policy to improve social welfare both in terms of containing
macroeconomic volatility and economic inequality.
Figure 3 presents impulse responses to a negative demand shock in the model with a 2% steady-state
interest rate. We compare the benchmark scenario in which there is no active LTV policy versus the
case where the LTV responds countercyclically to credit. Even though, in both cases, policy rates are
restricted by the ZLB, having an active LTV policy largely isolates borrowing from the demand shock.
As shown in the figure, the negative demand shock leads monetary policy to cut the interest rate to
22
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Figure 3: The effect of an active LTV rule with ZLB
zero, but the countercyclical LTV influences the borrowing cost implicitly by relaxing the borrowing
constraint for credit-limited agents in the economy. As a result, the economy with a countercyclical LTV
policy suffers from a smaller welfare loss in terms of the housing gap between savers and borrowers.
4.3 Optimal policy coordination
In this section, we set the optimal monetary and macroprudential policy rules jointly. In particular, we
differentiate between two cases: the perfect coordination policy and the non-coordination policy. The
perfect coordination policy considers the situation where monetary policy and macroprudential policy















The non-coordination policy, on the other hand, assumes that monetary policy and macroprudential
policy are set independently to achieve their separate policy objectives. For this experiment, we split
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the welfare-based loss function (27) into two parts:
WMP ' −1
2









where the loss function of monetary policy (28) reflects the monetary policy’s objective of mitigating
the welfare costs of business cycles, while the loss function of macroprudential policy (29) represents
the goal of the macroprudential authority of reducing the negative consequences of financial frictions on







, while the macroprudential authority does it by choosing the LTV rule












(φ∗b) = arg maxW
LTV (φb) .
Table 5 summarizes the optimal policy coordination results under both the high interest-rate en-
vironment (upper panel) and the low interest-rate scenario (lower panel). In the high interest-rate
environment, as shown in Section (3.1), the ZLB is very rarely binding, so that the main distortions in
the economy comes from sticky prices and collateral constraints. In this case, the perfect coordination
policy mix features a strong response to inflation and a strong response to credit by the LTV rule. This
set of policies achieves a lower welfare loss compared to the case where only LTV policy is optimized
in Table 4. Interestingly, when two policies are perfectly coordinated, the optimal policy prescription
behaves as if they were working "independently".26 Monetary policy is characterized by a strict infla-
tion targeting, addressing frictions from sticky prices,27 while the macroprudential authority is delegated
to manage imbalances between savers and borrowers, resulting from financial frictions. When optimal
policies are conducted independently, however, monetary policy is found to be optimal to respond to
output too. This is because, without the coordination with the macroprudential policy, monetary policy
is "distracted" from focusing on price stability. Instead, monetary policy also tries to smooth business
cycles to help borrowers in the economy, even though more effective and targeted tool (macroprudential
26 It echoes the "Tinbergen principle", in which two policies use different instruments to target different objective variables.
27This reflects the fact that the driving force of ineffi cient economic fluctuations in our model is a demand shock so that
the "divine coincidence" applies.
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policy) is available. As a result, non-coordination leads to a slightly greater welfare loss.
Table 5: Optimal Policy Coordination












Perfect coordination 5 0 5 -5.13 0.50 0.04 19.6 43.6
Non-coordination 5 0.45 5 -5.24 0.46 0.04 19.3 46.2
Low interest-rate environment
Perfect coordination 5 0.4 5 -7.81 0.80 0.07 34.3 56.6
Non-coordination 5 0.6 5 -8.08 0.84 0.07 34.9 58.0
Note: * not optimized policy parameters.
In the low interest-rate world, because monetary policy is more frequently restricted by the binding
ZLB, aggregate demand externalities, as emphasized in Farhi and Werning (2016), play an important role
in optimal policy. Under perfect coordination, monetary policy is also used to smooth business cycles.
Optimal LTV policy is again set to strongly respond to credit countercyclically. The non-coordinated
policy setting makes monetary policy respond to output even more strongly, which leads to a bigger
welfare loss compared to the perfect coordination setting.
In summary, in a low interest-rate environment, two reasons strengthen the role of macroprudential
policy intervention. First, the low interest-rate world is more prone to pecuniary externalities, that
calls for the use of macroprudential policies to bring a more stable financial system. Second, monetary
policy not only loses its effectiveness in bringing macroeconomic stability but also becomes a source of
aggregate demand externalities when it is constrained by the ZLB. In this case, macroprudential policy
can lend a helping hand to monetary policy in managing the cost of borrowing. We find that when
the interest rate is high, and the two policies can perfectly coordinate, the optimal policy prescription
behave as if they were independent. There are no conflicts between them. This is, however, no more the
case, when the interest rate is low and/or when monetary policy and macroprudential policy cannot be
perfectly coordinating. This more complex policy environment calls for more policy coordination.
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5 Robustness
In this section, we check the robustness of our key results in alternative settings of macroprudential
policy rules and more practical macroprudential loss functions.
5.1 Alternative LTV rules
We consider alternative LTV rules, which respond to the credit-to-GDP ratio, the output gap and an
LTV with a smoothing term. These rules are motivated by either practical or theoretical reasons. For
example, an LTV rule with smoothing captures the idea that macroprudential tools are adjusted very
gradually in practice. In addition, we also experiment with rules including the credit-to-GDP gap and
the output gap. The former is shown in empirical studies (see, e.g.: Drehmann and Juselius, 2014) as
a good early warning indicator of banking crises. The output gap captures precisely the welfare loss
caused by macro fluctuations associated with sticky prices.












High interest-rate environment %
LTV Rule with credit-to-GDP 0.3 - -10.34 2.1 0.24 17.5 61.8
LTV Rule with credit and output gap 0.5 0.6 -9.60 1.9 0.25 16.3 49.8
LTV Rule with smoothing 0.45 0 -9.72 2.0 0.24 16.8 52.9
Low interest-rate environment
LTV Rule with credit-to-GDP 0.7 - -16.68 3.6 0.47 39.6 55.1
LTV Rule with credit and output gap 0.8 0.6 -15.07 3.2 0.44 35.7 42.9
LTV Rule with smoothing 0.58 0 -15.96 3.4 0.44 36.4 59.1
Note: All volatilities and values of the loss function are reported in the unit of percentage points.
Results are shown in Table 6. Intuitively, an LTV rule responding to credit-to-GDP amounts to a
restricted version of the rule reacting to credit and output separately. In particular, we restrict the LTV
rule to respond to credit and output equally, but with opposite signs. Overall, the policy rule responding
to the credit-to-GDP ratio performs slightly worse than the LTV rule responding to credit and output
separately. On the other hand, when allowing the LTV rule to respond to both the credit-to-GDP ratio
and the output gap, we find that responding to the more precise measure of the welfare loss leads to a
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strong response of the rule, but the welfare gains are very small. Conversely, introducing smoothness
into the LTV rule reduces the effectiveness of the LTV policy in stabilizing the economy. This leads to
a weaker response to inflation and the output gap, which results again in a small welfare loss.
5.2 Alternative loss functions
In Table 7, we report our results based on alternative loss functions, which take the volatility of output,
the LTV ratio, the credit-to-GDP ratio, and the change in the LTV ratio into account. These alter-
natives are chosen based on practical reasons for conducting macroprudential policy. In practice, the
macroprudential authority does not know the true model of the economy, and hence the welfare-based
loss function is unknown to them. To conduct macroprudential policy, policymakers choose loss functions
evaluated by some observable economic variables and hope they can capture the welfare of the economy
to a large degree, based on theoretical models.
In this section, we report the optimal simple rules derived under four variations of the policy loss
function. First, we consider a loss function based on the volatilities of credit and output. This version of
the loss function reflects a more balanced objective of the macroprudential authority towards balancing
the volatility of the financial and the real sector. The second loss function takes the credit-to-GDP
ratio into account, in addition to the volatility of credit. This is a more financial-stability focused policy
objective. The third and fourth variations reflect the practical concern of the macroprudential regulator
on the stability of the policy instrument itself. These versions take the volatility of the LTV (and the
changes) into account. We derive the optimal simple rules and the associated values of the loss function
for each case. We also consider both the high and the low interest-rate environment.
27
































No LTV Rule - - 18.4 - - 50.5 - - 12.7 - - 12.7
LTV with Credit 0.55 - 5.4 0.55 - 2.4 0.55 - 3.39 0.55 - 2.1
LTV with Credit and Output 0.55 0 5.4 0.75 0.1 2.3 0.55 0 3.39 0.55 0 2.1
Low interest-rate environment
No LTV Rule - - 155.2 - - 327.9 - - 76.5 - - 85.2
LTV with Credit 0.65 - 28.4 0.85 - 11.1 0.65 - 26.2 0.65 - 16.1
LTV with Credit and Output 0.55 0.9 22.6 0.65 0.3 8.1 0.55 0.5 21.1 0.55 0.5 11.3
Overall, we find that our key results hold in all three variations of the loss function. First of all, in
a low interest-rate environment, macroprudential policies need to be more aggressive than in the high
interest-rate world. This is especially true for the second case, where the loss function takes both the
volatility of the credit-to-GDP ratio and the volatility of credit into account. This loss function makes
the volatility of credit very important for the macroprudential authority. As a result, the LTV policy
rule responds very strongly to credit in the low interest-rate environment, compared to the high interest-
rate world. Next, our conclusion about an independent role of output in the LTV policy function in
the low interest-rate environment is also supported by all three loss functions. We can see that, in the
high interest-rate scenario, the LTV rule responding to both credit and output does not make a huge
difference, as compared to the rule that reacts only to credit. It changes, however, when the steady-state
interest rate decreases. When the loss function puts more weight on output volatility, the optimized
LTV rule also responds strongly to output, but less to credit. Even when the loss function puts a strong
emphasis on financial volatility, the optimal rule still reacts to output. Overall, we find that all three
key results drawn from the previous section pass robustness tests with alternative loss functions.
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6 Concluding Remarks
This paper investigates stabilization policy in a low interest-rate environment. We use a DSGE model
with financial frictions, in which interest rates are permanently low and monetary policy is constrained
by the ZLB. In this context, we study the implementation of macroprudential policies, represented by an
LTV rule. In particular, we answer the following research questions: Are macroprudential policies more
relevant in a low interest-rate environment? Can macroprudential policies complement monetary policy
when the latter binds at the ZLB occasionally? Our quantitative results suggest that a low interest-
rate environment poses new challenges to conventional monetary policy, because of the occasionally
binding ZLB. As a result, monetary policy not only loses its effi cacy in stabilizing the economy but also
becomes a source of instability. In this case, monetary policy is in real need of a helping hand from
alternative policies. We focus in this paper on the role of macroprudential policy as a supplement for
monetary policy in the low interest rate environment. We show with numerical simulation results that,
if macroprudential policy is available, it can serve as an alternative stabilizing mechanism. In addition,
optimal coordination between monetary and macroprudential policies is welfare enhancing, especially in
the low interest rate environment.
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Yt = ωCs,t + (1− ω)Cb,t
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1−ε
]1/(1−ε)
+policy rules and shock processes
Steady-State Relationships
Here we derive the effi cient steady state, where we use three assumptions to eliminate distortions in the
model. First of all, we assume a steady state with zero inflation π = 1. This assumption eliminates
the distortion due to sticky prices. Second, we impose a tax (τ = ε−1) to intermediate goods firms to
eliminate the distortion due to monopolistic competition. Third, we assume that there is a tax on savers’
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housing demand, which closes the gap between housing holdings between savers and borrowers. Given
those assumptions, real marginal costs (markup) at the steady state are equal to one and the steady
state is symmetric across savers and borrowers.
Consider a social planner who maximizes a weighted average of borrowers’and savers’period utility
function, subject to the resource and housing constraints:




b = αCs + (1− α)Cb
0 = αHs + (1− α)Hb,
where ωp is an arbitrary weight assigned to each individual by the social planner. Let η1 and η2 be the




cs = αµ1 (A1)
(1− ωp)U ′cb = (1− α)µ1 (A2)
ωpU
′
hs = αµ2 (A3)
(1− ωp)U ′hb = (1− α)µ2 (A4)
ωpU
′
ns = −µ1αY/Ns (A5)
(1− ωp)U ′nb = −µ1 (1− α)Y/Nb (A6)













Further, at the effi cient symmetric steady state, we have
X = 1 (A8)
Cs = Cb = C (A9)
Hs = Hb = H (A10)
Y = C (A11)










= 1− α (A14)












The Lagrange multiplier on the collateral constraint is positive as long as our initial assumption βs > βb




(1− βb − λCbk) q
jb
=
(1− βb − k (βs − βb)) q
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(A16)











At the symmetric steady state, whereCbHb =
Cs
Hs


















(1− βb − k (βs − βb))− (1− βs) (A19)
τh = (βs − βb) (1− k) (A20)










The model can be reduced to the following linearized system, around the effi cient steady state, in which
all lower-case variables denote percent changes from the steady state and steady-state levels are denoted
by dropping the time index (also dropping the expectations operator, for simplicity):
Aggregate Demand
Savers
cs,t = cs,t+1 − (rt − πt+1) (A22)












(rt−1 + bt−1 − πt) +
QH
C






(wb,t + nb,t) (A25)
bt = kt + qt+1 + hb,t + πt+1 − rt. (A26)











(cb,t − hb,t) = Qqt − βbQ (cb,t − cb,t+1 + qt+1)− λCkQ (λt + kt + qt+1 + πt+1 + cb,t) (A29)
Aggregate Supply
yt = at + αns,t + (1− α)nb,t (A30)
πt = βsEtπt+1 − k̃xt (A31)
Savers
ws,t = yt − xt − ns,t (A32)
Borrowers
wb,t = yt − xt − nb,t (A33)
Policy Rules
rt = ρrt−1+ (1− ρ) [(1 + φπ)πt + φyyt] (A34)
kt = −φbbt − φyyt (A35)
Equilibrium
yt = ωcs,t + (1− ω) cb,t (A36)
ωhs,t + (1− ω)hb,t = 0 (A37)
34
Welfare-based Loss Function Derivation
Following Ferrero et al. (2018), we define the welfare objective of the policymaker as the present dis-
counted value of the utility of the two individuals. We assume that the policymaker discounts the future





where Ut = ωpUs,t + (1− ωp)Ub,t, and ωp is an arbitrary weight assigned to each individual by the
social planner. Given our functional forms:










We take a second-order approximation of Ut around the effi cient steady state:
Ut − U ' ωpUc
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Using Pareto effi cient steady-state relationships derived in the previous subsection:
ωpU
′
cs = αµ1 (A39)




hs = αµ2 (A41)
(1− ωp)U ′hb = (1− α)µ2 (A42)
ωpU
′
ns = −µ1αY/Ns (A43)
(1− ωp)U ′nb = −µ1 (1− α)Y/Nb (A44)

















Substituting out the functional forms:



























































To eliminate first-order terms, we make use of the resource constraint and the housing market equi-
librium (equations 19 and 20):
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Yt = αCs,t + (1− α)Cb,t,
H̄ = αHs,t + (1− α)Hb,t,
For algebraic convenience, we assign the arbitrary weights equal to labor income weights, so that ωp = α:
We also use the approximation equation for Yt
Yt ' Y
(
















(Cs,t − C) + (1− α)
1
C




Similarly, we eliminate first-order terms in housing by using
α (Hs,t −H) + (1− α) (Hb,t −H) = 0
to get














































α (Hs,t −H)2 + (1− α) (Hb,t −H)2
]
(A50)
To eliminate the first-order terms, we express variables in deviations from their respective steady
states.
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αc2st + (1− α) c2bt
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αh2st + (1− α)h2bt
]
+ higher order terms
Putting all together, we obtain
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Y (1 + η)
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αh2st + (1− α)h2bt
]
+ higher order terms (A51)
Using the production function log-linearized around the effi cient steady state, we have:
yt = αns,t + (1− α)nb,t − ∆̂t,
where ∆̂t is an index of price dispersion coming from the aggregation of the production function,






















µ1Y (1 + η)
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αh2st + (1− α)h2bt
]
+ higher order terms (A52)
At this point, the welfare objective is fully quadratic. To gain more economic intuition, we derive
further the welfare-based loss function as follows.
Using the housing market equilibrium we have:
hb,t = α (hb,t − hs,t)
hs,t = − (1− α) (hb,t − hs,t)
28We also dropped the aggregate productivity shock from the production function, because it is independent from policy.
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Then, the housing term becomes:
αh2s,t + (1− α)h2b,t = α (1− α) (hb,t − hs,t)
2
We can now substitute the housing term back and combine together the output, consumption and
labor terms:





αc2s,t + (1− α) c2b,t − y2t + (1 + η)
[












(1− θ) (1− βθ)π
2
t (A53)
Next, we work out the consumption and output terms:








= α (cs,t + yt) (cs,t − yt) + (1− α) (cb,t + yt) (cb,t − yt)
= α (cs,t + yt) (1− α) (cs,t − cb,t)− (1− α) (cb,t + yt)α (cs,t − cb,t)
= α (1− α) (cs,t − cb,t)2 . (A54)
We can substitute back into the welfare objective:





α (1− α) (cs,t − cb,t)2 + (1 + η)
[












(1− θ) (1− βθ)π
2
t (A55)
Next, we add and subtract (1 + η) y2t from the welfare function:





α (1− α) (cs,t − cb,t)2 + (1 + η) y2t + (1 + η)
[












(1− θ) (1− βθ)π
2
t (A56)






We can aggregate the two labor supply conditions and make the assumption that labor supply is







1+η Cs,t = (Nb,t)
1+η Cb,t
Log-linearizing, we obtain an expression for each type of labor:








Using the first-order approximation of the resource constraint:
ns,t = ∆̂t + yt − at +
1
1 + η
(1− α) (cb,t − cs,t)
nb,t = ∆̂t + yt − at −
1
1 + η
α (cb,t − cs,t)
Then, substituting each labor type into the labor term in the welfare function:
αn2s,t + (1− α)n2b,t − y2t = α
[
∆̂t + yt − at +
1
1 + η




∆̂t + yt − at −
1
1 + η
α (cb,t − cs,t)
]2
− y2t
Now, expanding the squared terms and dropping higher order terms, we obtain:
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(1− α) (cb,t − cs,t)
]2
+2α (1− α) 1
1 + η




α (cb,t − cs,t)
]2
−2α (1− α) 1
1 + η
(yt − at) (cb,t − cs,t)− y2t
Rearranging:
αn2s,t + (1− α)n2b,t − y2t ' (yt − at)







Substituting this expression back into the welfare function:



















(1− θ) (1− βθ)π
2
t (A57)
In a flexible price setting and given our assumption of log-utility, we know that the natural level of
output can be expressed in terms of technology:
ynt = at
Replacing this expression into the welfare function, we obtain:





















(1− θ) (1− βθ)π
2
t (A58)
Adding and subtracting the square of natural output, since it is independent from policy, we obtain:





α (1− α) 2 + η
1 + η













(1− θ) (1− βθ)π
2
t (A59)
Finally, the steady state coeffi cient (µ2H) of the housing term can be expressed in the terms of (µ1Y ),
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where we choose the housing utility parameter (j) to be one, then, we can express the welfare-based


















where ỹ, c̃ and h̃ are the output, consumption and housing gaps, respectively. The relative policy weights
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